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Interstate certification of questions of law:
a valuable process in need of reform
Although many states have adoptedportions of the Uniform Certificationof Questions of Law Act,
state-to-state variationsthwart the goals ofjudicialeconomy, uniformity, and comity among states.
An improved act would create consistency and promote greateruse of interstate certification.

by Ira P. Robbins

Certificatiotn

tory device that allows state
courts to answer questions
a state
statuof their own isstate
law where
no controlling precedent exists. The
statute may make certification available in both federal diversity cases and
in the state-to-state context.
In 1967, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, with the American Bar Association, proposed the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act'
("U.L.A.") to promote uniformity and
consistency in the administration of
the certification process between
courts. The U.L.A. long ago achieved
widespread acceptance in federal diversity cases. In this context, the process resolves many of the problems asThis article is adapted from Ira P. Robbins, The
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A ProposalforReform, 18 JouRNAL OF LEGISLATION 127-186
(1992).
1. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law
Act, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
2. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act,
Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49-51
(1975) (finding certification as more rapid
method of solving Erie problems than abstention
doctrine). See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) (requiring federal courts in nonfederal
matters to follow substantive state law); see also
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts may

sociated with the Erie doctrine.2

Courts, however, utterly fail to use
the certification process in the state-tostate context to alleviate many of the
procedural burdens stemming from
difficult and confusing choice-of-law
problems. Moreover, while many states
have adopted substantial portions of
the U.L.A., these states have either
omitted or expanded upon certain of
the act's provisions, thwarting its commendable goals of uniformity and interstate certification.'
This article addresses the merits of
certification and encourages universal
enactment of an improved U.L.A. The
proposed act seeks to surpass the current U.L.A. by establishing mandatory
uniform legislation, thereby creating
consistency among state-certification
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases involving state law).
3. For general discussions of certification, see
Corr and Robbins, InterjurisdictionalCertification
and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1988) (discussing arguments for and against certification
and concluding with empirical study of state and
federal judges); Roth, Certified Questions from the
Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1 (1979) (discussing certification in the
federal-to-state context); Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 lowA L. REV. 629 (1951 ) (presenting
pre-U.L.A. views on certification). See also Seron,
CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAw: EXPERIENCE OF

FEDERAL JUDC.ES (1983).

procedures. This new uniformity
should further the goals of comity and
expedience while simultaneously making both interstate and federal diversity certification more accessible. In
part, the proposed legislation seeks to
accomplish these tasks by mandating
that equivalent state courts be the only
ones with the power to certify and answer such questions.
The proposed act also requires consistency in the types of questions certified
and answered, as well as in the time limits for responding. With newly enforced
uniformity, the benefits of both interstate and federal-to-state certification
will be more fully realized than under
the current patchwork system.

Origins of interjurisdictional
certification
Certification allows certifying courts to
obtain answers to difficult, previously
unaddressed questions of law, or to
questions of law with no controlling
precedent. These questions typically
arise when courts must decide cases
based on another jurisdiction's law.
Specifically, the certifying court presents the question to the court best
suited to answer the question, or to a

higher court within the same jurisdiction. In the past, however, differentjurisdictions in both the United States
and Great Britain have adopted disparate forms of this procedure. The promulgation of divergent acts and rules
limited the use and thwarted the development of the certification process.
The current U.L.A. attempts to unify
the various certification processes in
order to create consistency of application irrespective of the certifying or
answering court.
The concept and use of interjurisdictional certification developed relatively
recently in American jurisprudence.
Prior to formulation of the U.L.A., some
scholarly work had been done in the
area, primarily by Allan Vestal, then professor of law at the University of Iowa and
one of the commissioners on uniform
state laws. This early research and thinking formed the basis for many of the
policies ultimately realized in the U.L.A.
The contributions of Professor Vestal
and other academicians to the development of the contemporary certification
process cannot be underestimated.
The British experience was one of
the sources for the commissioners'
ideas on interjurisdictional certification and suggested methods for implementing such a system in the United
States. Under both international and
interstate conflict-of-laws doctrines, it
often becomes necessary to discover
and apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction to determine the rights of the litigants in the forum. The uniform law
commissioners vigorously debated
ways to rectify this problem. To support their ideas, the commissioners
looked to the British Law AscertainmentAct of 18594 and the Foreign Law
Ascertainment Act of 1861.
The British Law Ascertainment Act
permitted courts in one part of the
British Commonwealth to remit cases
for an opinion on a question of law to
courts in another part of the Commonwealth. The Foreign Law Ascertainment Act allowed questions of
law to be certified between British
courts and courts of foreign countries,
provided that each country had signed
a convention governing such procedure. 6 The precepts of the U.L.A. find
their basis in these acts. The conflictof-laws provisions of both the U.L.A.
126 Judicature Volume 76, Number 3

and the British acts serve the same
purpose: clarification of nonforum
law when necessary to the resolution
of a case.
Both British acts provide that statements of the facts, either agreed to by
the parties or set forth by the court,
must accompany certified questions.
The acts also mandate the binding nature of opinions rendered by answering courts, although certifying courts
may resubmit opinions to answering
courts "on any ground whatsoever" if
the former doubt the opinion's accuracy. In contrast, answering courts in
the United States receive greater deference, because the U.L.A. refused to allow for remittiturs to answering courts.
Within the United States, Florida,
Hawaii, Maine, and Washington had
adopted interjurisdictional certification procedures prior to the promulgation of the U.L.A. 7 The commissioners patterned the U.L.A. largely on
Florida Appellate Rule 4.61 (in addition to British law), as Florida had enacted the first interjurisdictional procedure in the United States.' Despite
the existence of this certification procedure in Florida since 1945, and Pro-

fessor Vestal's pioneering 1951 article
describing its benefits, the four state
certification statutes lay dormant until
1960, when the U.S. Supreme Court
authorized their use in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd." Soon thereafter,
the Supreme Court employed the procedure in Aldrich v. Aldrich's and
Dresner v. City of Tallahassee." In these
two cases, the Court certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme
Court. This action brought the certification procedure to the attention of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which used the Florida statute
in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,' 2
Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,'13 and
Life Insurance Co. v. Shifflet.'4 Maine

4. British Law Ascertainment Act, 22 & 23 Vict.,
1859, ch. 63 (Eng.).
5. Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 24 & 25
Vict., 1861, ch. 11 (Eng.).
6. The Act of 1861 was never used, because no
such conventions were ever signed; it was finally
repealed in 1976. See Statute Law (Repeals) Act
1973 (Colonies) Order 1976 (SI 1976 No. 54).
Despite the fact that these acts apparently met
with little success, the basic principles provide a
useful foundation for the U.L.A. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners'
prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49 n.1 (1975).
7. FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1945) (amending FLA.
At't'. R. 9.150 and 4.61); HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 214,
§§26-27 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §57
(WEST 1964) (amended by Rule 76 B.M.R.C.P.);
WASh. REV. COnE ANN. §2.60.020 (West Supp.
1975) (originally enacted at 1965 Wash. Laws, ch.
99, §1).
8. Paragraph (a) of Florida Appellate Rule
9.150, amending Rule 4.61, reads:
"Discretionary Proceedings to Review Certified
Questions From Federal Courts.
(a) Applicability. Upon either its own motion

ers' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 50 (1975). Hawaii's
statute had not been tsed prior to Clay. Maine's
and Washington's statutes were adopted after
Clay.
10. 375 U.S. 75 (1963) (certifying four questions to Florida Supreme Court in alimony case on
certiorari from West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals).
11. 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (certifying qttestions to
Florida Supreme Court concerning issue of
Florida lower court power to review cases from
state circuit court). Exactly why the Supreme
Court attthorized the Fifth Circtit to certify the
questions in Clay but certified the questions itself
in Aldrich and Dresner is unclear. Perhaps the
Court thought that certifying the questions itself
would save time for the litigants.
12. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (certifying questions to Florida Supreme Court regarding proper
construction of Florida law concerning whether
absolute liability applied to manufacturer or producer of cigarettes), certified questions answered in
154 So. 2(d 169 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
943 (1964).
13. 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966) (certifying
questions of state law to Florida Supreme Court in
diversity case involving Florida's application of Illinois wrongful-death statute).
14. 370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967) (certifying
questions to Florida Supreme Court concerning
proper construction of Florida Insurance Code).
15. 253 F. Sttpp. 913 (D. Me. 1966) (certifying
questions of state law involving bankruptcy case to
Maine Suprene Judicial Court).
16. 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966) (answering questions certified by federal district court regarding
whether release of liability in tort action is permissible ttnder state law).
17. See generally Corr and Robbins, supra n. 3
(discussing arguments for and against certification, based in part on empirical study ofjudges).

or that of the party, the Supreme Conrt of the

United States or the United States Court of Appeals may certify a question of law to the Supreme
Court of Florida whenever the answer is determinative of the cause and there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida."
FtA. App. R. 9.150(a) (1945). Florida ChiefJustice
Leander J. Shaw, Jr., recently commented on the
stccess of Rtle 9.150, calling it one of the "many
examples of positive state/federal cooperation."
Shaw, Remarks at the 1991 Eleventh CircuittJudicial Conference (May 25, 1991), at 4.
9. 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (certifying questions involving state law to Florida Supreme Court to
avoid resolving constitutional issue). See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commission-

October-November 1992

had also used the procedure in In re
6
Richards" and Norton v. Benjamin"
prior to the adoption of the U.L.A.

Benefits of interjurisdictional
certification
Proponents of the certification process praise it for promoting judicial
economy, comity, ease of application,
fairness to litigants, and-most importantly-for avoiding judicial guesswork. 17 Proponents also maintain that,

as a practical matter, certification allows jurisdictions to decide their own
law where no clear precedent exists to
guide foreign jurisdictions on the applicable law. These comments, however, come from federal and state
judges only in the context of federalto-state certification.
While federal-to-state certification
addresses Erie problems, interstate
certification also provides "a valuable
device for securing prompt and authoritative resolution of unsettled
questions of state law, especially those
that seem likely to recur and to have
significance beyond the interests of the
parties in a particular lawsuit."'" The
interstate-certification process is necessary because it eliminates judicial
guesswork and beneficial because it advances justice and fairness.' Twelve jurisdictions have incorporated a state-tostate certification provision into their
certification lawsY0 The potential simplicity and ease of application of these
laws lends credence to the use of the
certification method.
The Supreme Court's decision in
Clay v. Sun Insurance, coupled with the
experience of the four states with previously enacted certification statutes,
helped mold the outcome of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, held in 1966
and 1967. A draft of the U.L.A. was
first presented and discussed in 1966.
It highlighted three major issues: (1)
whether to allow for state-to-state certification; (2) which courts should be
able to certify a question of law to another state's supreme court; and (3)
whether the act should take the form
of a statute or a rule.
18. Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955,
957 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that certification has
been important tool).
19. See, e.g., National Cycle, Inc. v. Savoy
Reinsurance Co., 938 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1991)
("Certification eliminates the need to expend judicial resources predicting how another court will
decide a question."); Dickenson v. Townside T.V.
& Appliance, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 n.8
(S.D. W. Va. 1990) (stating that, without certification, court "would be left to decide the issue
based on its informed 'prediction' of how [the
answering court] would have ruled had it accepted such certification"); Gafiii, Certification to
State Courts Stops Judicial "Guesswork", 10 PA. L.J.
Rep. no. 48, at 3 (Dec. 21, 1987) (discussing general merits of certification process).
20. The jurisdictions are Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. A list of certification procedures in United States jurisdictions is
available from Judicatureon request.

The interstatecertification process
eliminates judicial
guesswork and
advances justice
and fairness.

Then Chief Judge Charles Joiner of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan stated the purpose of the act as follows: to establish a
"procedure whereby federal and state
courts can obtain at appropriate times
and in an appropriate manner a resolution of a significant problem of law
of a state, to help the [certifying] court
resolve the problem before it."2 At
the time of the conference, federal
courts, in response to the dictates of
the Erie doctrine, had two options
when faced with unclear state law: they
could abstain from hearing the statelaw claims, or they could try to predict
the applicable state law. Exercising either of these possibilities meant that
courts chose between failure to decide
an issue before them and basing their
decisions on doctrine that was potentially at odds with the very law they
21. Transcriptof Proceedingsof Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 1 (Aug.
3, 1966) (statement of Charles Joiner).
22. See, e.g., Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon
Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Mass. 1985) (answering
questions from First Circuit regarding choice-oflaw issue of whether to apply Massachusetts or
New York law); Baird v.Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d
288, 290-291 (Mass. 1977) (responding to question regarding construction of parental-notification statute to assist determination of statute's
constitutionality); Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Mediation Soc'y, 342 A.2d 262 (Me.
1975) (construing licensing statute to answer certified question in diversity action involving Maine
and California residents), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1042 (1976).
23. See supra n. 20 (listing jurisdictions).
24. See Corr and Robbins, supra n. 3, at 432-433
(discussing complexity and manipulability of
choice-of-law issues, with emphasis on doctrine of
renvoi).

sought to apply.
The act attempted to address the inadequacy of these alternatives by providing
federal courts with a third option-certification. Certification simplified and
validated the procedure for determining
the relevant state law while preserving
the parties' right to a federal determination of the factual questions in the suit.
The extent to which conflict-of-laws
problems could be resolved by this process was only a secondary concern to the
commission. The commissioners expected the act to improve federal-state
relations, promote uniformity in the law,
and more expeditiously resolve litigation
that presented novel legal issues. The reported cases involving certified questions suggest that these objectives have
been attained.22 Nevertheless, only 11
states and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico have adopted statutes that are
nearly identical to the U.L.A. 5 Thus,
only these jurisdictions can benefit fully
from the advantages that certification
brings to conflict of laws in both federalto-state and interstate situations.
State courts without the ability to
certify in the appropriate context have
the same two alternatives as their federal counterparts-abstention or
guesswork. The concern with these
two options is the same as in the federal context. The presence and use of
interstate certification provisions in
state statutes and court rules would
solve these problems, just as they have
in the federal-to-state sphere. Nevertheless, in the 47-year history of certification in this country, no state judge
has ever used these state-to-state certification procedures.

Reasons for nonuse
The nonuse of interstate certification
usually stems from the various choiceof-law approaches and exceptions that
allow jurisdictions to avoid applying
the law of another state, even in cases
in which such law seems to govern. By
using escape devices and other techniques to conclude that the law of the
forum should be applied, courts often
engage in judicial conjecture at the
expense of fairness andjustice.24 States
that either manipulate choice-of-law
doctrine to avoid certification or lack a
certification procedure justify nonimplementation by the fear that certi-

fication will result in a deluge of cases
flooding their court systems.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, this
justification appears to have little weight.
In the nearly half-century history of the
interjurisdictional-certification process,
only a handful of questions have ever
been certified. And all of these questions
have been sent from the federal to the
state courts. None of the 40jurisdictions
with certification procedures has reported being overburdened by the number of certified questions, despite the
prevalent fear of inundation.
In addition, a number of procedural
devices built into certification statutes
decreases the possibility of hardship by
permitting self-policing by both certifying and answering courts. Certifying
courts will only certify those questions
of law for which no controlling precedent exists in answeringjurisdictions. 52
Furthermore, the ultimate power to
accept or reject certified questions
rests exclusively with answering
courts. 6 These two procedural safeguards more than adequately protect
answering courts fiom a surfeit of certification cases because, as a practical
matter, these courts completely control their dockets and may reject certified-question cases if the number becomes overwhelming. Answering
courts need not even offer an explanation, although most courts do offer a
reason for declining to answer.
Many of the states that do not employ certification procedures argue
that, as an outgrowth of inundation,
response time would become severely
delayed and actual litigation greatly
slowed. Yet given that the number and
frequency of certified questions remains small, the issue arises only when
dockets are already overburdened. In
addition, even if the number of certifications increases, most courts give
preferential treatment to certified
questions, often assigning them priority over intrastate questions. After all,
cases that have the capacity to clarify
existing law or to address an issue of
first impression would potentially
minimize other time-consuming litigation. Even if certification actions become somewhat slowed during the
process, this seems a small price for
correct resolution of the matter.
Courts should be placing a premium

on deciding cases well, notjust quickly.
Thus, as the fear of overburden from
certification is unfounded, the real
reasons for the nonuse of interstate
certification more likely are mere ignorance of the process and its benefits, and a desire for jurisdictions to
maintain control over questions of law.
These factors become readily apparent upon examination of the reasons
for the limited use of certification in
the federal-to-state context and its rejection or lack of use in the state-tostate context. In the federal-diversity
setting, certification encourages state
courts to maintain or extend control
over questions of their own law (by allowing state courts to receive and decide questions). That is, state courts
rule on issues that should be decided
by reference to their state's law, rather
than to federal law. In the state-to-state
context, however, state courts may
view the act of sending a certified question to another state as a surrender of
control. Indeed, the total lack of interstate-certification cases supports this
hypothesis. 2 Thus, forum courts effectively maintain control over cases that
are better answered by another state
through various conflict-of-laws processes. 2 The states that hope to retain
such control fail to appreciate that,
ideally, as a matter of comity, each co-

operating state would not only certify
questions, but also answer those from

25. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act
§1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). Certification is notappropriate where there are controlling state decisions.
Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 1165,
1167-1168 (9th Cir. 1984). It cannot be tsed by
the litigants for back-door modifications of settled
state law. Id.
26. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act
§1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
27. Other speculations have been made concerning why state-to-state certification is unused,
including forum bias and that the fortm state prescribes that it has greater expertise or equal
knowledge to that of an answering coturt. See Corr
and Robbins, supra n. 3, at 431-433. Forum bias
cannot be overcome by optional certification. The
idea that the forum court possesses greater knowledge or expertise than the answering court defies
logic. The answering court applies and interprets
its state law regularly, while the forum court faces
relatively unfamiliar territory when expounding
the law of another jurisdiction.
28. Renvoi arises when the choice-of-law process of the forum jurisdiction refers the court to
the choice-of-law rtle of the foreign jurisdiction.
See generally Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in
Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REv. 523 (1918);
Stein, Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Renvoi, 17
McGu, L.J. 581 (1971); Comment, Renvoi and the
Modern Approaches to Choice-of-Law, 30 AM. U. L.
REv. 1049 (1981). Often the doctrine of renvoi as
well as unfavorable law can be avoided by employing such escape devices as characterization of the
issue. Simply put, if a forum court determines that
the case before it is a torts case rather than a contracts case (when in fact there are elements of

both tort and contract involved) it may be able to
apply its own law if it uses the place-of-the-injury
rule for torts instead of the place-of-making rule
for contracts.
Although the courts have many alternatives in
the choice-of-law arena, often a state relies on the
law of the forum. See, e.g., Leflar, McDougal and
Felix, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW 143-145 (4th ed.
1986). Another malleable tool is for the state
court to find that the application of another
state's law would violate the public policy of the
forum. Id.; see also Comment, supra, at 1051.
29. When discussing balance-of-power issues,
comity usually arises in the federal-state context
involving diversity-of-citizenship cases and issues
involving federal-question jurisdiction. Miner, The
Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor Relief 51 ALB. L. REV. 151, 151-157 (1987).
In the federal-to-state certification context, certification is a tool for administering comity. In the
state-to-state context, however, the system is not
self-administering because there is no doctrine
like Erie to mandate compliance. State courts are
more likely to want to answer questions than to
send them, because they perceive it as surrendering control to the answering court.
30. Connecticut, for example, in its extensive
legislative history of certification, makes no mention of interstate certification. The complete lack
of discussion suggests ignorance. SeeHearings on
H.B. 6249 Before the joint Standing Subcommittee
(1985). Equally important, legislators-lawyers
and nonlawyers alike-often are unaware of the
conflict-of-laws ramifications of the substantive
laws that they pass.
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other jurisdictions.

29

It remains true that interstate certification has not been employed, even in
states providing for it by statute. Perhaps the fact that not all states have
such statutes deters those that do from
using the process, as states tend not to
extend privileges without expecting
reciprocity. Although many of the
states with certification statutes have
provisions for interstate certification,
some only have the power to answer
certified questions and not the power
to propound them. Thus, the goal of
comity in this area must await legislatures and courts to enact new statutes
and rules.
The lack of understanding and
knowledge of the purposes and merits
of interstate certification presents another reason for general nonuse. Legislators often remain ignorant about
the possibility of interstate certification." And when interstate certification statutes are enacted,judges unanimously fail to use them. This situation
presumably arises from simple lack of
awareness, rather than from outright
rejection of certification. Both the
Connecticut and Minnesota statutes,
for example, append identical, incorrect lists of jurisdictions that possess

certification statutes." This lack of information is symptomatic of the general level of ignorance and confusion.
The inconsistent use of federal-tostate certification and the nonuse of
interstate certification is not surprising
when the certification system, which
relies on interaction with other jurisdictions, is replete with inconsistencies
concerning the jurisdictions with
which the process can be employed. To
correct the misuse and lack of use of
certification, statutes need to be consistent across jurisdictions. The Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act
attempted to bring that about. It has
not succeeded, however, primarily because states either have failed to adopt
the U.L.A. or have adopted dissimilar
versions of key U.L.A. provisions.

Actual operation of certification
procedures
Of the 40 jurisdictions that have
adopted certification procedures, 26
have done so since 1975.32 The number of certified questions is also on the
rise. Support for certification has increased in the past decade. In February 1983, for example, the American
Bar Association's Special Committee
on Coordination of Federal Judicial
Improvements resolved to:
(a) [urge] each state to adopt a procedure whereby the highest court of the
state may answer a question of state law
certified from an Article III court of the
United States, when the answer will be
controlling in an action in the certifying
court and cannot in the opinion of the certifying court be satisfactorily determined
in light of state authorities; [and]
(b) [urge] the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to review the U.L.A. in
light of the experience since 1967 to deter31. See CONN. GEN. STAr. ANN. §51-199a (West
1987) (listing only 27 jurisdictions with certification procedures); MINN. STAT. ANN. §480.061
(West Supp. 1986) (same). More recent codifications continue the error. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §51-199(a) (West Supp. 1989); MINN. ST,\T.
ANN. §480.061 (West Supp. 1989).
32. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Coltmbia,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. A list of certification
procedures in United States jurisdictions is available from Judicatureon request.
33. Report with Recommendations, American
Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates
Special Committee on Coordination of Federal
Judicial Improvements (Feb. 1983).
34. See supra n. 20 (listing jurisdictions). Con-

3
mine whether revisions are appropriate. 1

Declarations like this one-as well,
perhaps, as renewed attention by the
commissioners on uniform state
laws-may provide the incentive for
the remaining jurisdictions lacking
certification to adopt the procedure. It
would be unfortunate if jurisdictions
refrained from adopting good certification procedures-or, indeed, any
certification procedure at all-simply
because of continued misperceptions
and unwarranted fears.
Even with this increase in support
for certification, no reported case has
used interstate certification to resolve
a conflict-of-laws situation. This total
absence perhaps should not be surprising, given that only 12jurisdictions
34
possess interstate-certification power,
and because state courts must address
several threshold issues before being
able to find appropriate cases for certification. Courts wishing to certify, for
example, must initially determine that
the suit in question poses a real conflict-of-laws question. Then they must
ensure that the issues presented meet
the standard required for certification. Faced with amorphous choice-oflaw rules, and, hence, difficult and
time-consuming analysis, judges may
feel justified in using forum law (or
that of a third jurisdiction) when no
law exists in the proper jurisdiction.
Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding predictions of "determinativeness," as required by Section 8 of
the U.L.A., 5 offers another motivation, based on ease of application, for
judges to "predict" another state's law
or to use the law of their own jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the "may
versations with various clerks of court indicate
that most of them remain unaware that their
states could accept or certify questions from
courts of another state.
35. Section 8 of the U.L.A. provides:
"The [Supreme Court] [or the intermediate
appellate courts] of this state, on [its] [their] own
motion or the motion of any party, may order certification of qtuestions of law to the highest court
of any state when it appears to the certifying court
that there are involved in any proceeding before
the court questions of law of the receiving state
which may be determinative of the cause then
pending in the certifying court and it appears to
the certifying court that there are no controlling
precedents in the decisions of the highest court or
intermediate appellate courts of the receiving
state."
Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act §8,
12 U.L.A. 55 (1967).

be determinative" language of Section
8 receives a universally liberal construction, potential certifying courts
may incline toward interstate certification because they would no longer feel
hampered by trying to make impossible predictions about determinativeness. The adoption and use of interstate certification would increase
and would dramatically impact the
uniform development of the law, as
well as comity among the states.

Proposal for a new U.L.A.
The lack of use of the U.L.A. stems
from ignorance regarding the values
of certification (particularly with respect to solving difficult conflict-oflaws questions), the act's optional language on interstate certification, and
the variation and inconsistency among
the states that permit the process. By
its very nature the certification process
demands interaction between courts,
and thus fails without uniformity. To
promote the use of certification, provisions must be efficient and easily applied. Courts need to feel a sense of
comity, which stems only from confidence that other jurisdictions with
whom they interact operate under the
same strictures. Consequently, the current multiprocedure approach of disjointed processes following the U.L.A.
theme and variations discourages the
use of certification.
The remainder of this article, therefore, proposes uniform legislation designed to overcome these deficiencies
and thereby advance the use of certification. The proposal mandates all provisions and, to be of greatest value,
should be adopted in the form presented on page 130.

Method of enactment
States enact certification processes either by statute or court rule. States
that require a statute may adopt this
proposed language as a uniform entity. Some states require that the state
constitution be amended to expand
the jurisidiction of the state's highest
appellate court, thereby including certification within its powers. State constitutions also could be amended to
permit the highest appellate court to
enact its own rules, thus allowing that
court to incorporate this proposed

language into its already-existing
rules. No matter which vehicle states
choose, they may enact certification.
Power to answer
The U.L.A. permits not only state high
courts to receive and respond to certified questions, but also provides discretion for use of this power by intermediate appellate courts. This
power-to-answer provision requires
modification to prohibit intermediate
appellate courts from answering certified questions of state law. Allowing
these intermediate courts to answer
promotes inefficiency, because high
courts maintain appellate jurisdiction
to reverse any determination on appeal. Appeals to higher courts create
unjustified delay in the certification
process. Moreover, the highest court
in the state, as the final arbiter of state
law, is best equipped to address questions of first impression.
The absolute power to answer by the
highest state court affords exclusive
discretion to answering courts to receive and respond to certified questions. The provision allows self-policing and protects answering courts from
inundation, irrelevant questions, and
answering matters that are outside of
their jurisdiction or currently pending

in lower courts. Of utmost importance,
answering courts need not provide artificial reasons to avoid responding.

Which courts may certify
The U.L.A. makes certification available to the U.S. Supreme Court, circuit courts of appeals, and U.S. district
courts. 6 The commissioners intended
that this language be obligatory on
states adopting the U.L.A. Often, however, statutes that implement the
U.L.A. restrict certain federal courts'
ability to certify. In addition, the commissioners left the language pertaining to state-court certification power
in the enacting states' discretion.
All federal courts and the highest
state appellate courts should be able to
certify questions to answering courts.
Thus, the proposed uniform statute
obliges states to enact their certification statutes to permit all of the abovementioned courts to certify. This proposed language eliminates discretion
in statutes and rules in the implementation of certification procedures. It
furthers the goals of comity and reduction ofjudicial conjecture and, significantly, retains appropriate state courts
as final arbiters and controllers of
their own laws.
This proposed provision, in con-

junction with the power-to-answer provision, removes the concern of an appeal in both the state-to-state and federal-to-state context. Only the highest
state court may prepare or answer certified questions, eliminating the possibility of appeal present when a lower
state court poses or answers a question. On the federal-to-state level, the
answer of the state's highest court
binds all federal courts, and thus cannot be overturned even if an appeal
occurs in the federal case.
This proposal gives district courts
certification power, as they hear the
bulk of diversity cases. In the federal
context, district courts are most attuned to which questions need to be
certified to resolve consistently arising
questions of state law. These courts
possess equal capabilities with the federal appellate courts to ascertain the
clarity of state laws. Thus, state statutes
and rules prohibiting federal district
courts from sending certified questions are unjustified and unwise.

36. In 1990, the uniform law commissioners
added to this list the United States Court of International Trade, theJudicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, the United States Claims Cotrt, the
United States Court of Military Appeals, and the
United States Tax Court. SeeUnif. Certification of
Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1991).

Summary of an improved Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act
§1. Power to Certify
The [Supreme Court'], on its own
motion or the motion of any party to
the cause, may order certification of
questions of law to the highest court of
any other state, when it appears to the
certifying court that there are involved
in any proceeding before the court
questions of law of the receiving state
that may be determinative of the cause
then pending in the certifying court
and for which there are no controlling
precedents in the decisions of the
highest court of the receiving state.
§2. Power to Answer
(a) The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it by
1. This term is bracketed, for thejurisdiction to
substitute the title of its highest appellate court.
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the Supreme Court of the United
States, a Court of Appeals of the
United States, a United States District
Court, the United States Court of International Trade, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, the United
States Claims Court, the United States
Court of Military Appeals, the United
States Tax Court, or the highest appellate court of any other state or the District of Columbia.
(b) The [Supreme Court], when
sent a question by a certifying court,
may answer those questions of law that
may be determinative of the cause before the certifying court.
§3. Reciprocity Requirement
This jurisdiction, having the power
to certify, is empowered to accept certified questions from all jurisdictions
October-November 1992

having the power to certify.
§4. Preference
The [Supreme Court] shall respond
to certified questions as soon as practicable, comporting with notions of
comity and fairness.
§ 5. Contents of Certification Order
A certification order shall set forth:
(1) the question(s) of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all facts
relevant to the question(s) certified
and showing fully the nature of the
controversy in which the question(s)
arose. If the parties cannot agree upon
ajoint statement of facts, the certifying
court must make this determination.
§6. Preparationof Certification Order
The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by
the judge presiding at the hearing, and

Reciprocity requirement
In conjunction with the power to answer and the power to certify, this proposal mandates a reciprocity requirement. All of the jurisdictions that
accept certified questions must also be
empowered to certify them. The reciprocity requirement seeks to attain
uniformity and to assure all participating states of like treatment. This equality breeds confidence in the identity of
their powers and responsibilities, thus
making them more amenable to certifying questions when necessary. The
tenets of comity and trust must be exercised through reciprocity for the
successful use of the certification process. Uniform reciprocity assures
states that some balance will be
achieved by discouraging courts from
using only one of the powers of certifi-

cation for fear of inundation, delay, or
loss of control. The heart of certification rests on the interactive process,
requiring participating jurisdictions
both to answer and to certify.

37. Section 1 of the U.L.A. provides:
"The [Supreme Court] may answer questions
of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the
United States, a Court of Appeals of the United
States, a United States District Court [or the high_
est appellate court or the intermediate appellate
court of any other state], when requested by the
certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state
which may be determinative of the cause then
pending in the certifying court and to which it
appears to the certifying court that there is no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate
courts] of this state."
Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1,
12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).

When state courts may answer
State courts should respond to certified questions when issues concerning
their law may be determinative of the
case. The "may be determinative" language set forth in Section 1 of the
U.L.A. 7 comports with the notions of
uniformity and ease of application of
the proposed language. Many jurisdictions, however, adopted statutes containing the too restrictive "must be determinative" standard. This more
stringent test leads to counterproductive battles concerning which questions should be answered. The answering and certifying courts then become
bogged down in procedural, rather
than substantive, determinations. The
"must be determinative" language
shackles certifying courts, placing procedural locks on certification when
the process requires openness to function properly.
The more permissive "may be determinative" language allows both certifying and answering courts to reach
the crux of substantive issues quickly.

forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by
the clerk of the certifying court under
its official seal. The [Supreme Court]
may require the original or copies of all
or of any portion of the record before
the certifying court to be filed with the
certification order, if, in the opinion of
the [Supreme Court], the record or
portion thereof may be necessary in
answering the questions.
§7. Costs of Certification
Fees and costs shall be the same as in
[civil appeals] docketed before the
[Supreme Court] and shall be equally
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court
in its order of certification.
§8. Procedures for Certification
The procedures for certification
from this state to the receiving state

shall be those provided in the laws of
the receiving state.
§9. Opinion
The written opinion of the [Supreme Court] stating the law governing the question(s) certified shall be
sent by the clerk under the seal of the
[Supreme Court] to the certifying
court and to the parties.
§ 10. Power to Amend the Question
The receiving court shall have the
ability to reshape or reformulate the issues presented in the certificate. Certifying courts will explicitly allow the receiving court to do so in the certificate.
§11. Severability
If any provision of the [Act] [Rule]
or the application thereof to any person, court, or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect

The removal of artificial procedural
barriers allows answering courts full
discretion to self-police. Thus, the
"may be determinative" language promotes forthright judicial decisionscertification's ultimate goal.

No controlling precedent
Some states have set forth a "no clear
controlling precedent" standard, instead of a more liberal "no controlling
precedent" standard. The more restrictive "no clear controlling" language leads to the same empty procedural problems as presented in the
"must be determinative"/"may be determinative" dichotomy. Jurisdictions
that employ the "no clear controlling"
language use it to limit the number of
questions sent and to avoid answering
certified questions. No discernible difference exists between the "no clear
controlling" and the "no controlling"
standards, except for the manner in
which courts interpret them for their
own purposes. As a practical matter,
however, because statutes always receive varying judicial intepretations,
the proposed statute mandates the
broader language to avoid tortured
analyses and unnecessary distinctions.
(Under the new statute, for example,
courts faced with conflicting authority

other provisions or applications of the
[Act] [Rule] that can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions
of this [Act] [Rule] are severable.
§12. Construction
This [Act] [Rule] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
jurisdictions that enact it.
§13. Short Title
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as
the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule].
§14. Time of Taking Effect
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect

in state law could certify, because by
definition the issue would meet both
the "no controlling" and "no clear
controlling" precedent tests.)

Unaltered U.L.A. language

provide a better alternative to solve
the problems associated with the Erie
doctrine. Unfortunately, the act's efficiency has been undermined by the
failure of many states to adopt the act
Preferential treatment
or an equivalent procedure, as well as
for certified questions
by the disparate language that some
Certified questions should have prestates employ in their certification statferred status on the dockets of answerutes. Scant legislative history in adopting courts to encourage prompt reing states and sparse judicial construcsponse and action. Such a statutory
tion of the various statutes and rules
directive remedies the problem of decombine to make it difficult to ascerlay. The provision must not mandate
tain not only the rationale for adoptpreferential treatment of certified
ing language different from the
questions, however, in order to mainU.L.A., but also the practical implicatain discretion on the part of answertions, if any, of that language.
ing courts.
The act has had no great success as
Broad language allows answering
yet in aiding the resolution of conflictcourts to control their dockets, yet is Interstate certificationof-laws cases. The inconsistency of
forceful enough to induce answering power to certify
statutory language among the states
and certifying courts to respect one Many existing certification statutes rel- has rendered interjurisdictional certianother's needs reciprocally. This provi- egate interstate certification to op- fication almost impotent. The decision encourages courts to respond tional or nonexistent status. The pro- sion of the U.L.A. commissioners to
quickly so that the reverse situation will posed act emphasizes the importance make adoption of interstate certificaresult in an equally prompt answer. of certification in the interstate con- tion optional unfortunately contribKeeping in mind the magnitude of the text by mandating its adoption. It is uted to the failure of more than half of
courts' dockets and the burden on the imperative for states to enact and use the states with certification procedures
courts, the "as soon as practicable" stan- interstate certification to maximize similar to those of the U.L.A. to prodard for answering is a good compro- the rewards of the certification pro- vide for interstate certification. Until
mise, leaving courts free to determine cess. Interstate use can effectively re- all states provide for such certification,
their own schedules. If a court fails to re- move judicial speculation in conflict- however, the full panoply of benefits
spond within a reasonable time, other of-laws situations, just as federal- that certification offers remains becourts may apply appropriate pressure, to-state certification can resolve Erie yond the reach of courts and litigants
noting their dissatisfaction.
problems. In addition, interstate certi- facing conflict-of-laws situations.
It is imperative that the revised
fication can promote judicial economy
Method of invoking certification
U.L.A. proposed by this article be
and timely responses.
Under this proposal, courts would inWhen state courts employ various brought to the attention of the legislavoke certification upon their own mo- devices to determine another state's tors and state officials who have the intion or that of the litigants when the law, resulting decisions can be consid- fluence to make adoption of the act a
courts deem it necessary. Certifying ered precedent that is binding on fu- reality in their jurisdictions. The unijudges would ultimately control whether ture litigants, even though the proper formity of the proposal overcomes the
questions will be certified and sent. This court never ruled on the issue. Thus, problems that the original U.L.A. does
method ensures that certification will be adversity can arise because outside not address. Further, the value of certiemployed only when certifying courts courts lack the requisite knowledge or fication for conflict-of-laws cases must
insight required to assess possible rami- be particularly emphasized, since many
believe it is important to do so.
fications of their decisions. Certifica- states that currently have certification
Contents of certification order
tion in this context can produce honest procedures need to be aware of the enThe proposed statute includes a provision judicial opinions. 38 When the appropri- hanced values that interstate certificato clarify who controls the statement of facts ate state's highest court responds to a tion can provide. The proposed certifisent to answering courts. This addition certified question, this process assures cation procedure effectuates the full
avoids delay in sending questions to answer- litigants of application of the correct force of uniformity, ease of application,
ing courts by giving certifying courts con- statement of that state's law, whereas and, most important, the elimination
trol of their schedule.
employing renvoi3 9 or common con- ofjudicial guesswork.
LI
flict-of-laws escape devices is tantaIRA P. ROBBINS is the Barnard T. Welsh
38. See Leflar, HonestJudicial Opinions,74 Nw. U.
mount to judicial conjecture.
L. REv. 721 (1979) (asserting the importance of
well-articulated, honest reasons in the justification for judicial decisions, particularly in choiceof-law cases).
39. See supra n. 28 (discussing doctrine of
renvoi).
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The U.L.A. contains a great deal of language that fits well when incorporated
into this proposal. As articulated
throughout this article, the problems
with the U.L.A. stem from lack of uniformity and nonrestrictive language, rather
than from problems with the fundamental premises underlying the statute.
The sections of the U.L.A. concerning the preparation of certification orders, the costs of certification, briefs
and arguments, and opinion, aptly delineate effective language for this legislative proposal. Other sections provide
standard provisions for most uniform
laws and thus require no alteration.

Conclusion
By adopting the U.L.A., the uniform
law commissioners sought primarily to
October-November 1992
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